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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3010 
___________ 
 
DANIEL WESLEY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DAVID A. VARAND, Superintendent of SCI Coal Township; 
ROBERT MCMILLIAN, Deputy Superintendent of Facility Management; 
RHONDA M. ELLETT, Deputy Superintendent of Centralized Services; 
ANTOINETTE M. SHEDLESKI, Food Service Manager;  
JOHN DOE, Food Service Steward; 
KATHY MCCARTHY, Health Care Administrator;  
EDWARD A. SCHETOMA, Dental Medical Doctor; 
KANDIS K. DASCANIS, Superintendent’s Assistant;  
FACILITY GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR,  
sued in their official and individual capacity  
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-12-cv-01131) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 8, 2012 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: November 28, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Daniel Wesley, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the 
dismissal of his civil rights complaint by the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as 
well as the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration.  We will summarily 
affirm. 
I. 
Wesley brought a civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against numerous 
correctional officials, including several superintendents and food and health 
administrators at the State Correctional Institution Coal Township (“SCI Coal 
Township”), where Wesley is presently incarcerated.  Wesley alleged that the Defendants 
were deliberately indifferent to his safety and placed him at risk of serious harm by 
carrying out a conspiracy to serve a discharged bullet in his food during dinner on May 
31, 2011.  He further alleged that biting on the bullet caused chunks of his teeth to fall 
out, and claimed that a dental professional in the prison repaired the damage to his teeth 
resulting from this incident.  Wesley sought compensatory and punitive damages, along 
with injunctive relief in the form of a special diet for the duration of his confinement. 
 The District Court dismissed Wesley’s complaint for “fail[ure] to state a claim on 
which relief may be granted” in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Wesley 
timely filed a notice of appeal.  The following day he filed a timely motion for 
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reconsideration with a supporting brief.  The District Court denied Wesley’s motion for 
reconsideration.  Wesley then timely filed an amended notice of appeal.   
Wesley moved to proceed in forma pauperis.  The Clerk granted the request.  
Accordingly, we now consider the possibilities of dismissing Wesley’s appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or taking summary action.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.1  
Under our rule, we may take summary action on an appeal that presents “no substantial 
question.”  Id.
II. 
  
 We have jurisdiction over both the appeal of the order dismissing the complaint 
and the order denying Wesley’s motion for reconsideration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Our review of a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim is plenary.  
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We must accept as true all of the 
factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in favor of 
the plaintiff.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).  We review a denial of 
the motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 
666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).  A motion for reconsideration is a limited vehicle used “to 
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”  
                                              
1 Wesley was afforded twenty-one days to submit argument in support of his appeal.  He 
has not responded. 
Max’s 
 
 
 
4 
Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros
III. 
, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citation omitted). 
 We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court dismissing Wesley’s 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  To survive 
dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Notably, in order to state 
a viable claim, a plaintiff must allege personal participation by the defendants in the 
alleged wrongdoing.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  A 
corollary to this is that a supervisor may not be held vicariously liable for the wrongs of 
his subordinate.  To state a viable claim against a supervisor a plaintiff must make 
“allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence” in the 
wrongdoing.  See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353-54 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode, 
845 F.2d at 1207).2
                                              
2 As the District Court correctly pointed out, most of the Defendants merely reviewed 
Wesley’s grievances within the prison system, and were not actually involved in the 
incident.  To the extent, if any, that Wesley intended to make a separate claim based on 
the handling of his grievance, we are not persuaded.  See Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 
729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that inmates do not have a constitutionally 
protected right to the prison grievance process); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 
1994) (holding that “the Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or 
access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state”).  We observe that 
Wesley’s grievance was in fact addressed, albeit not to his liking. 
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Wesley alleged in his complaint that there was an overarching conspiracy among 
the Defendants against him.  He stated that the Defendants “carri[ied] out a conspiracy to 
place a discharged bullet in [his] food” and that “food service personnel[] watched [him] 
eat his food with a discharged bullet in it without interfe[]ring to correct the matter.”  
Comp. 3-4, June 15, 2012, ECF No. 1.  However, he did not point to any facts that 
indicate the named Defendants were ever together, or were ever allied against him in 
particular.  Wesley simply does not paint a plausible picture of a wide-ranging conspiracy 
by the named Defendants.  See Iqbal
After setting aside the allegations of a conspiracy that is implausible on its face, 
we are left with the one-time adulteration of Wesley’s food, which he believes constitutes 
“cruel and unusual punishment.”  Comp. 3, 8, ECF No. 1.  He is mistaken.  “It is 
obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the 
conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”  
, 556 U.S. at 678. 
Whitley v. Albers, 
475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).  “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth 
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official 
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”  Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  “[A]n accident or inadvertence or mere negligence 
does not [in itself] trigger the Eighth Amendment.”  Grabowski v. Jackson Cnty. Pub. 
Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1395 n.12 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
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U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976)).  Wesley’s complaint did not plausibly allege anything more 
than simple negligence, if that.3
Wesley claimed that there was improper training and supervision of the food 
service personnel, but he did not point to any facts suggesting the Defendants were aware 
of and disregarded an excessive or substantial risk of harm to him.  Perhaps Wesley was 
suggesting that the supervisors he named should be held liable for the unusual one-time 
event he described.  However, as we noted above “liability cannot be predicated solely on 
the operation of respondeat superior,” 
 
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (citations omitted) and a 
constitutional violation cannot be predicated on negligence.  Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312, 319 (1986).  Wesley’s factual allegations simply do not rise to the standard required 
to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.  See Wilson v. Seiter
Lastly, we note that Wesley included the prison dentist, Edward A. Schetoma in 
his list of defendants.  It is difficult to understand which claims Wesley attributes to 
Schetoma specifically.  Wesley did not allege that Dr. Schetoma exhibited deliberate 
indifference in treating his dental problem, whatever its nature or source.  
, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).  
See White v. 
Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Estelle
                                              
3 David Varano, the superintendent of SCI Coal Township, explained the incident 
complained of was an unfortunate and isolated event, likely caused by a mistake during 
the canning process and not due to negligence on the part of prison food management.  
Comp. Ex. 24, ECF No. 1. 
, 429 U.S. at 103, 106).  
It appears Wesley’s claim is simply that Dr. Schetoma could not verify that his dental 
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problem was caused by a bullet.  See Comp. 5, ECF No. 1; Br. Sup. Mot. Rec. ¶ 9, ECF 
No. 17.  But that does not state a viable claim.  See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.  Moreover, 
we reiterate that Wesley did not “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw a 
reasonable inference that” Schetoma participated in a conspiracy against him.  See Iqbal
 In light of the above, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the 
complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The complaint simply did 
not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
, 
556 U.S. at 678. 
Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570.  We further agree with the District Court that granting Wesley leave to 
amend was not necessary under the circumstances.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hospital
IV. 
, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Finally, we perceive no error in the District Court order denying Wesley’s motion 
for reconsideration.  The District Court may amend a judgment if the moving party shows 
that there was either an intervening change in the law; newly discovered evidence is 
available for consideration; or a clear error of law must be corrected to prevent manifest 
injustice.  Max’s Seafood Café
 
, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).  Wesley did not 
identify any of these factors in his motion.  Thus, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration. 
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V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d 
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
